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Fax: 886 2 2785-3946.Spatial Economic Theory of Pollution Control under
Stochastic Emissions
Abstract. This paper examines the eectiveness of environmental policies in curtailing
pollution of a rm which is operating in a space economy under stochastic emissions.
We consider a general n-input planar space production-location model, in which the
output is produced jointly with the byproduct pollution. Although production is non-
stochastic, the resulting pollution emission is assumed to have a random component,
and the polluting rm must make its production and location decisions before the un-
certainty is resolved. We provide some propositions concerning the comparative statics
of the polluting rm's location choices, urban pollution concentration, and the relative
impact of regulation via emission taxes to that of emission standards.
Key words: location theory; pollution control; emission uncertainty
JEL classication: D80; H25; Q28; R381. Introduction
In recent years, much eort has been channeled into studying the eects of environ-
mental policy on plant location. There are signicant contributions to the literature on
how a rm's location within a region is inuenced by environmental policies. Studies
along this line include Mathur (1976), Gokturk (1979), Forster (1987) and Hwang and
Mai (2003). The results they obtain indicate that a tax and/or regulation on urban
pollution concentration may not succeed in pushing the polluting rm away from the
urban center. The other strand of the literature addresses the issue of plant endogene-
ity in a two-region model that involves two polluting rms whose location decisions are
inuenced by the environmental policies. In the analyses of Markusen, et al. (1993),
Motta and Thisse (1994) and Ulph (1994), it is assumed that the environmental policy
is given or that the environmental targets are exogenous, environmental policies are
shown to have a very strong impact on a rm's choice of location. In Markusen, et
al. (1995), Rauscher (1995), Hoel (1997), Markusen (1997), Ulph and Valentini (1997)
and B arcena-Ruiz and Garz on (2003), however, the environmental policy is considered
to be endogenous and there are strategic interactions between governments. These
studies show that the Nash equilibria of the game are generally not Pareto optimal.
The literature is cast entirely in a deterministic world. This is somewhat surpris-
ing, since pollution is random by nature. For given production levels, there may exist
considerable uncertainty regarding the magnitude of pollution consequences. Fuel and
other inputs may be random in quality, while weather and other stochastic environ-
mental factors may also contribute to the level of pollution generated (Hennessy and
Roosen, 1999).1 As it is well known that uncertainty aects the eciency of the rm's
performance, the purpose of this paper is to extend the analysis by introducing emission
uncertainty.
Specically, to investigate the eectiveness of environmental policies in curtailing
1Even if pollution is nonrandom, measurement errors may give rise to stochastic penalities.
1the pollution of a rm, we consider a general n-input planar space production-location
model, which subsumes the linear market stipulated by Mathur (1976), Gokturk (1979)
and Forster (1987) and the Weberian triangle adopted by Hwang and Mai (2003) as
special cases. The output is produced jointly with the byproduct pollution. Although
production is nonstochastic, the resulting pollution emission is assumed to have a
random component, and the polluting rm must make its production and location
decisions before the uncertainty is resolved.
In addition to the Introduction, this paper has four other sections. Section 2 poses
the expected utility maximization problem for the polluting rm, and also characterizes
the optimal production and location conditions. Section 3 develops the comparative
statics concerning the eects of emission control on the polluting rm's choice of loca-
tion and the pollution concentration in the urban center, and in Section 4 we compare
the impact of regulation via emission taxes to that of emission standards on the pol-
luting rm's expected utility and urban pollution concentration. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
It is assumed that that there are n + 1 relevant sites for the polluting rm: one is
the market site for the output, which can be thought of as a high density urban center
(point C in Figure 1), while the others are the locations from where the inputs come
(points L1;:::;Ln in Figure 1).
[Place Figure 1 about here.]
According to Figure 1, h is the distance between the rm's plant location R and
urban center C; and si is the distance between the rm's plant location R and Li, the









i + h2   2dihcosji   j; i = 2;:::;n;
where di denotes the distance between the urban center C and Li; and ;2;:::;n are,
respectively, the angles L1CR;L1CL2;:::;L1CLn. Given the sites of C and L1;:::;Ln,
it is evident that each rm's plant location is determined once  and h are chosen.
Output q and pollution emissions ! are joint products of the inputs. The production
function of the rm is specied as
Q = F(M1;:::;Mn);
where F is a twice continuously-dierentiable function with the properties that Fi 
@F=@Mi > 0 and Fii  @2F=@M2
i  0; i = 1;:::;n:
Although production is assumed to be nonstochastic, the resulting pollution emis-
sion is held to be proportional to production and to have a random component:
! = Q": (1)
Here,  is a constant of proportionality that can be called the pollution coecient.
The multiplicative source of randomness, ", is assumed to have unit expected value
and standard deviation , namely
" = 1 + z; (2)
with E(z) = 0;2
z = 1 and Pr(z >  1=)=1. The randomness may arise from varia-
tions in input quality (e.g., more sulfurous coal) or in weather variables such as rain
and wind (Hennessy and Roosen, 1999).
The government can use one of two instruments for controlling pollution, an emis-
sion tax, where emissions are taxed at a rate t per unit of pollution emission, or an
emission standard, where the government announces an upper limit  ! on emission
quantity, with a ne  being imposed per unit of excess emission. We will not analyze
how the government makes the choice of the tax rate or emission standard, but will
3simply assume they are given. It is also assumed that the government can perfectly
monitor the rm's emissions. Thus, there is no room for moral hazard, and the rm
will pay a pollution bill exactly according to the amount of pollutants they emit.
The prot of the rm is
 = (p   rh)Q  
n X
i=1
(pi + risi)Mi   :
It is assumed that the rm is a price taker in all markets, (p;p1;:::;pn) are the prices of
output and inputs, (r;r1;:::;rn) denote the constant transport rates per unit quantity
and distance of output and inputs, and pi + risi is the delivered price of input Mi; 
is the pollution payment of the rm, which equals t! if the environmental policy is an
emission tax, whereas  = (!    !) if an emission standard is imposed.2
Without knowing the exact pollution emission, the rm has to make decisions
concerning production and plant location. It is assumed that the objective of the
rm is to maximize the expected utility of prots. The rm's attitude towards risk is
summarized by an increasing, concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U,




To explore the rm's optimal decisions, a two-stage optimization algorithm is used.
Moreover, at each stage of the maximization problem, it is supposed that an interior
solution exists, and that the second-order conditions are satised.
The rst stage of the maximization problem involves nding the optimal input
combination which maximizes the expected utility at a given location choice (h;).




0  i] = E[U
0  ((p   rh   )Fi   Pi)] = 0; i = 1;:::;n; (3)
2We assume ! >  ! throughout the analysis for the sake of simplicity.
4where Pi  pi + risi, and   @=@Mi = t" (") if the pollution control policy is
an emission tax (standard).






; i;j = 1;:::;n; i 6= j: (4)
We have from (4) that, ceteris paribus, the rm's expansion paths are straight lines
through the origin under emission uncertainty if the production function is homothetic.
This equation is important in the comparative statics that follows.
Let Mi(;h) be the value of Mi satisfying (3), and let (;h) be the corresponding
maximum value of prots. The second stage of the optimization problem is to nd the














0] = 0: (6)
Since E[U0] > 0, we know from (5) and (6) that
n X
i=1




risihMi(;h) = 0: (8)
We are now in a position to examine the eect of emission control on the polluting
rm's choice of plant location and on the pollution concentration in the urban center.
3. Emission Control, Production Location and Urban Pollution Concentra-
tion
3.1 When Will the Location Invariance Hold?
Hwang and Mai (2003) have demonstrated within a deterministic Weberian space
model that the plant location of a polluting rm is invariant with respect to a change
in emission standard if the production function is linear homogeneous. The following
5proposition extends their result to the most general n-input planar space case with
stochastic emissions, and to the imposition of an emission tax:
Proposition 1. Assume a world with emission uncertainty. The polluting rm's
choice of location is invariant with respect to the imposition of an emission tax/standard
if the production function is linear homogeneous.
Proof: It is easy to see from (7) and (8) that the optimal (;h) will not change (and
hence location invariance will occur) as long as (M1;:::;Mn) move proportionately and
Q=Mi remains unaltered for any i after the imposition of an emission tax/standard.
If the production function is linear homogeneous, Fi(M1;:::Mn) is homogeneous of
degree zero for any i and, thus, (4) remains satised for any input combination propor-
tional to (M1;:::;Mn). Since any proportionate change in (M1;:::;Mn) will also keep
F(M1;:::;Mn)=Mi unaltered for any i, the same location choice must be chosen from
(7) and (8). }
3.2 Predicting the Location Shift
It is also of interest to know the shift in location if the polluting rm's plant location
is not invariant with respect to the imposition of an emission tax/standard. In their
attempts, Mathur (1976) and Gorturk (1979) showed in a linear space model that
an emission tax may not succeed in pushing the polluting rm away from the urban
center. Hwang and Mai (2003) demonstrated unambiguously the impact of a change
in emission standard on plant location when the production function is homogeneous
of degree k 6= 1. In the following, we present results that generalize previous ndings.
The proof is given in Appendix 1.
Proposition 2. Assume a world with emission uncertainty. The polluting rm's abso-
lute risk aversion index is decreasing and its relative risk aversion index is increasing.
The rm's choice of plant location will be farther away from (nearer to) the urban cen-
6ter in response to the imposition of an emission tax/standard if the production function
is homogeneous of degree k > (<) 1.
Proposition 2 generalizes previous ndings in the sense that the result is valid for
any planar space, not just for the locational triangle or the linear market. It also holds
for any number of inputs, not just for the case of one or two inputs, and holds for any
form of emission uncertainty, not just for the case of a deterministic world.
To interpret the result of Proposition 2, note that from (7) and (8), the plant lo-
cation is determined entirely by the trade-o between the transportation costs of the
output and the inputs under emission uncertainty. Following the imposition of an emis-
sion tax/standard, the distribution of  shifts to the left. The expected prot is lower,
and the variation in the prot distribution either increases proportionally (in the case
of an emission tax) or remains constant (in the case of an emission standard). Given
that the absolute risk aversion index is decreasing and the relative risk aversion index
is increasing, the polluting rm considers itself poorer and tends to be more risk-averse.
Therefore, the level of output decreases. The optimum input ratios, however, remain
unchanged due to the homogeneity of the production function, and the input/output
ratios rise/decline if the production function exhibits increasing/decreasing returns to
scale. The pulling force of output, therefore, decreases/increases in relation to that
of inputs and, as a result, the polluting rm's choice of plant location will be farther
away from/nearer to the urban center.
3.3 Eect of Emission Control on Urban Pollution Concentration
Following Mathur (1976), it is assumed that the pollution concentration in the
urban center, !(0), depends upon the amount of emissions generated at the production
site and upon the distance between the urban center and the production site, namely
!(0) = !  (h); (9)
7where (:) is the pollution diusion function over distance with 0 < 0 and 00  0.
Since !(0) is random, we examine the eect of a stricter emission control policy on
expected urban pollution concentration, which gives
@E[!(0)]
@t


















The rst terms on the right hand side of (10) and (11) represent the output eect of
emission control on expected pollution concentration in the urban center, whereas the
second terms represent the locational eect. Given decreasing absolute risk aversion
and increasing relative risk aversion, the level of output decreases unambiguously in
response to a stricter emission control policy.3 However, it may not succeed in pushing
the polluting rm away from the urban center if the rm's production function exhibits
decreasing returns to scale (based on Proposition 2). In that case, if the locational
eect outweighs the output eect, a stricter emission control policy may lead to a
higher expected urban pollution concentration. This leads to
Proposition 3. Assume a world with emission uncertainty. The polluting rm's abso-
lute risk aversion index is decreasing and its relative risk aversion index is increasing.
A stricter emission control policy will reduce expected pollution concentration in the
urban center if the rm's production function exhibits non-decreasing returns to scale.
However, it may result in an increase in expected urban pollution concentration if the
production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
4. Emission Taxes vs Standards
Policy-makers are regularly confronted with the task of choosing policy instruments
to achieve environmental goals. In an eort to shed some light on the policy implica-
tions of the results, we address the following question below: Is some form of pollution
3Note that a decrease in  ! indicates that the government adopts a stricter emission control policy.
8control policy more preferable to rms or governments than the other type?
In making comparisons of the impacts of emission taxes/standards, the concept
of dierential incidence is used,4 which requires comparing the two instruments with
equal expected emission payments, namely
tQ = (Q    !):
It follows that
Qdt =  d !: (12)







































Given that U00 < 0, the sign of (13) is unambiguously negative since E[U0z] > 0,6
whereas that of (14) depends on the rm's attitudes toward risk and the characteristics
of the production function. The following proposition summarizes the results, and the
proof is given in Appendix 2.
Proposition 4. Assume a world with emission uncertainty, and in which the pollut-
ing rm's expected emission payment is xed. (i) The polluting rm's expected utility
associated with the imposition of an emission tax will be lower than that associated with
the imposition of an emission standard. (ii) Given that the polluting rm's absolute
risk aversion index is decreasing and its relative risk aversion index is increasing, the
imposition of an emission tax will result in lower expected pollution concentration in
the urban center than will the emission standard if the production function exhibits
non-decreasing returns to scale.
4See Musgrave (1959).
5See footnote 2.
6The proof is similar to that previously demonstrated by Sandmo (1971, p. 67).
9The result of Proposition 4(i) is intuitively appealing: recall that the imposition of
an emission tax makes the variation in prot increase, whereas it remains unchanged
in the case where an emission standard is imposed. Given that the polluting rm is
risk averse, with a xed expected emission payment, it would certainly prefer emission
standards to taxes. To interpret part (ii) of Proposition 4, note that a greater variation
in the prot distribution caused by the imposition of an emission tax will make the rm
more risk averse than will the emission standard. Therefore, relative to the imposition
of an emission standard, the polluting rm will decrease output more and the choice of
plant location will be farther away from (the same distance from, nearer to) the urban
center in response to the imposition of an emission tax if the production function is
homogeneous of degree k > (=;<) 1. The expected pollution concentration in the
urban center will thus be lower when the governments use emission taxes than when
they use emission standards if the polluting rm's production function exhibits non-
decreasing returns to scale.
5. Conclusion
This paper examines the eectiveness of environmental policies in curtailing the
pollution of a rm which is operating in a space economy under stochastic emissions.
Specically, we consider a general n-input planar space production-location model.
The output is produced jointly with the byproduct pollution. Although production is
nonstochastic, the resulting pollution emission is assumed to have a random component,
and the polluting rm must make its production and location decisions before the
uncertainty is resolved. It is demonstrated that
(i) location invariance occurs for emission taxes/standards if the polluting rm's pro-
duction function exhibits constant returns to scale (Proposition 1).
(ii) Given decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion, the
10polluting rm's choice of plant location will be farther away from (nearer to)
the urban center in response to the imposition of an emission tax/standard if the
production function exhibits increasing (decreasing) returns to scale (Proposition
2).
(iii) A stricter emission control policy may result in an increase in expected urban
pollution concentration if the polluting rm's production function exhibits de-
creasing returns to scale (Proposition 3).
This paper also compares the impact of regulation via emission taxes to that in rela-
tion to emission standards on the polluting rm's expected utility and the pollution
concentration in the urban center (Proposition 4). It shows that, for a given amount
of expected emission payment, a risk-averse polluting rm would prefer emission stan-
dards to emission taxes. However, given that the polluting rm's absolute risk aversion
index is decreasing and its relative risk aversion index is increasing, to reduce the ex-
pected pollution concentration in the urban center, the choice of an emission tax Pareto
dominates an emission standard if the production function exhibits non-decreasing re-
turns to scale.
The production-location framework employed in our analysis, while useful for pro-
viding insights into the output/spatial eects of environmental policy, has little to say
regarding questions as to the choice of envionmental policies by governments. Extend-
ing the model to address optimal environmental taxation/standards is a promising area
for future research. Alternatively, more extensive policy analysis, such as studying the
eects of subsidies to a residual abating input or issuing a number of tradable permits,
also appears to be an interesting direction for future research.
11References
B arcena-Ruiz, J. Carlos and M. Bego~ na Garz on. 2003. \Strategic Environmental
Standards, Wage Incomes and the Location of Polluting Firms," Environmental
and Resource Economics, 24, 121-39.
Forster, Bruce A. 1987. \Spatial Economic Theory of Pollution Control: Reections
on a Paradox," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 15, 470-74.
Gokturk, S. Sadik. 1979. \A Theory of Pollution Control, Location Choice, and
Abatement Decisions," Journal of Regional Science, 19, 461-67.
Hennessy, David A. and Jutta Roosen. 1999. \Stochastic Pollution, Permits, and
Merger Incentives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 37,
211-232.
Hoel, Michael. 1997. \Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations," Scan-
dinavian Journal of Economics, 99, 241-259.
Hwang, Hong and Chao-cheng Mai. 2003. \On the Eects of Pollution Regulation
with an Endogenous Plant Location," Environmental and Resource Economics,
forthcoming.
Markusen, James R. 1997. \Costly Pollution Abatement, Competitiveness and Plant
Location Decisions," Resource and Energy Economics, 19, 299-320.
Markusen, James R., Edward R. Morey and Nancy Olewiler. 1993. \Environmental
Policy when Market Structure and Plant Locations are Endogenous," Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 24, 69-86.
Markusen, James R., Edward R. Morey and Nancy Olewiler. 1995. \Competition in
Regional Environmental Policies when Plant Locations are Endogenous," Journal
of Public Economics, 56, 55-77.
12Mathur, Vijay K. 1976. \Spatial Economic Theory of Pollution Control," Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 3, 16-28.
Motta, Massimo and Jacques-Francois Thisse. 1994. \Does Environmental Dumping
Lead to Delocation?" European Economic Review, 38, 563-76.
Rauscher, Michael. 1995. \Environmental Regulation and the Location of Polluting
Industries," International Tax and Public Finance, 2, 229-44.
Sandmo, Agnar. 1971. \On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price Uncer-
tainty," American Economic Review, 61, 65-73.
Ulph, Alistair. 1994. \Environmental Policy, Plant Location and Government Protec-
tion," In C. Carraro (ed.) Trade, Innovation, Environment, Kluwer.
Ulph, Alistair and L. Valentini. 1997. \Plant Location and Strategic Environmental
Policy with Intersectoral Linkages," Resource and Energy Economics, 19, 363-83.
13Appendix 1. Proof of Proposition 2.





























i=1[risiMi + risi  (@Mi=@)] < 0
h = h   
Pn
i=1[risihMi + risi  (@Mi=@h)]
hh   
Pn
i=1[risihhMi + (rFi + risih)  (@Mi=@h)] < 0
t   
Pn
i=1 risi  (@Mi=@t)
ht   
Pn
i=1(rFi + risih)  (@Mi=@t)
 !   
Pn
i=1 risi  (@Mi=@ !)
h !   
Pn
i=1(rFi + risih)  (@Mi=@ !)












 (h !   h !) (A:3)
where D2  hh   2
h > 0 by the second-order condition of the second stage of the
maximization problem.
Note that, from (7), risiMi =
P





rjsj  [Mi  (@Mj=@t)   Mj  (@Mi=@t)]=Mi (A:4)
 ! =  
X
j6=i
rjsj  [Mi  (@Mj=@ !)   Mj  (@Mi=@ !)]=Mi (A:5)
If the production function is homogeneous of degree k, then
14(i) Equation (4) remains satised when M1;:::;Mn change proportionally in re-










Substituting (A.6) into (A.4) and (A.5) gives t =  ! = 0.
(ii) Since Q =
Pn
i=1 FiMi  (k 1)Q, (8) can be rewritten as
Pn
i=1(rFi+risih)Mi  
(k   1)rQ = 0 and, therefore, we have (rFi + risih) =  
P
j6=i(rFj + rjsjh)Mj=Mi +
(k   1)rQ=Mi, it follows that
ht =  (k   1)rQ  (@Mi=@t)=Mi; (A:7)
h ! =  (k   1)rQ  (@Mi=@ !)=Mi: (A:8)
When t increases or  ! decreases, the rm's prot level shifts downward. Since the
absolute risk aversion index is decreasing, the rm will decrease its optimal production,
and hence @Q=@t < 0 and @Q=@ ! > 0. Through the use of the chain rule, @Mi=@t =
(@Mi=@Q)(@Q=@t) and @Mi=@ ! = (@Mi=@Q)(@Q=@ !). Since all inputs are assumed
to be normal, @Mi=@Q > 0 8i, and thus @Mi=@t < 0 and @Mi=@ ! > 0.
Substituting (A.7), (A.8) and t =  ! = 0 into (A.2) and (A.3), we arrive at
Proposition 2.
Appendix 2. Proof of Part (ii) of Proposition 4.
Note that the total variable cost function can be derived by minimizing the total






s.t. Q = F(M1;:::;Mn)
15If the production function is homothetic, as is well known, C(:) can be expressed as
the product of two functions:
C(P1;:::;Pn;Q) = c(P1;:::;Pn)H(Q):




= HQ if the production function exhibits constant returns to scale.
< decreasing
(A:9)
The polluting rm's prot function can thus be rewritten as
 = [(p   rh)Q   c(P1;:::;Pn)H(Q)]   :
The objective of the rm is to nd out the optimal level of output and the plant location
in order to maximize E[U()]. The rst-order conditions for the optimization problem
are
@E[U()]=@Q = E[U
0Q] = 0 (A:10)
@E[U()]=@ =  cE[U
0] = 0 (A:11)
@E[U()]=@h =  (rQ + chH)E[U
0] = 0 (A:12)
where Q = p   rh   c(:)HQ   t" (= p   rh   c(:)HQ   ") if an emission tax
(standard) is imposed.








































2  H (A:16)
16where D is the relevant Hessian determinant, and D1  (cchh   c2































2  H (A:18)
We have D < 0, D1 > 0, and c > 0 by the second-order conditions, and ch < 0 from
(A.12). Moreover, following similar procedures as those previously adopted by Sandmo
(1971, pp. 68-70), it is easy to show that E[U00Q] > 0 if the absolute risk aversion
index is decreasing, and E[U00Q] < 0 if the relative risk aversion index is increasing.
Accordingly, E[U00Qz] > 0 given that the absolute risk aversion index is decreasing
and the relative risk aversion index is increasing. It follows that the sign of (A.17)
is strictly negative, while that of (A.18) is positive (zero, negative) if the production
function exhibits increasing (constant, decreasing) returns to scale based on (A.9). Put
together, we see from (14) that part (ii) of Proposition 4 holds.
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